COIN

Bringing time into the assessment of counterinsurgency warfare.

Ten easy to follow recommendations to help you become an effective military advisor.

Interoperability is a function of leadership, hardship, and time. To quickly achieve it, focus on individual personalities, understand that everyone has value, and exercise mission command.

Understanding the correlation between an insurgency’s goals and their IED design is crucial to defending against the devices and forecasting IED threats.

One consistently wrong—but always convenient—prediction has been the improbability of ground wars and the declining utility of ground forces.

Despite success at degrading Philippine terrorist networks, much of the security gains have been transitory, while the underlying socio-economic problems in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago...

While COIN remains the convention, to varying degrees, in post-conflict and steady-state operations, rule of law will be an essential part of the US security mission.

When Afghanistan failed, then COIN was seen as having failed too, having proved itself too risky, too time-consuming to justify its extraordinary investment in lives and treasure.

From 13-14 May 2010, the COIN shura took place in Kabul aboard Camp Julien, the COIN Academy in Afghanistan to refocus the Surge's forces on COIN.

The Afghan knows he has much to learn from the American. Americans are often too intellectually arrogant to admit they have several things that they can learn from Afghans.

The Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army is struggling for survival.

Afghanistan required a different approach yet we failed in our analysis, strategy, and application of resources.